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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In addressing constitutional cases, judges face no shortage of legal rules, tests, 
principles, doctrines, and policies upon which to draw.1  In those cases, the challenge 
is assumed to be to identify and apply the most relevant such legal rules, tests, 
principles, doctrines, and policies.  An accompanying judicial opinion tries to 
                                                          
 *
  Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School 
of Law. 
 
1
 Merely for example, in the free speech area, a court might, depending upon the nature 
and circumstances of the case, consider some sort of “clear and present danger” test; a test for 
“true threats;” “hecklers’ vetos;” “fighting words” of several varieties; overbreadth; prior 
restraints; public and private figure libel; other sorts of “low value” speech, including speech 
involved in torts and crimes; numerous forms of commercial speech; obscenity and several 
different classifications of pornography; speech and symbolic conduct; allegedly indecent 
speech or conduct; various forms of hate speech and group defamation; a distinction between 
content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech; public forum doctrine; speech in 
various kinds of electoral contexts; speech in and out of public schools; public employee 
speech; freedom of association; and “compelled speech” in several contexts, almost all of the 
above with alternative analyses.  See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1029-
1399 (6th ed. 2009). 
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articulate this process, partly to legitimize the outcome, partly to provide guidance, 
and perhaps partly for purposes of civic education and inspiration.2 
All of this seems familiar and unobjectionable.  Perhaps it is accurate as a 
description of what judges ordinarily do in constitutional cases.  This Article, 
however, recommends a somewhat different approach to constitutional adjudication.3  
Specifically, this Article recommends supplementing the above standard forms of 
constitutional adjudication with appropriate and legitimate4 attention to what are 
classically referred to as the Four Cardinal Virtues.5  These cardinal virtues are 
thought to include wisdom,6 especially practical wisdom or prudence in a broad 
sense; courage7 or fortitude; temperance8 or self-control and proper self-restraint; 
                                                          
 
2
 For classic discussions of judicial decision making, with some attention to constitutional 
law, see, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Andrew L. 
Kaufman ed., Quid Pro Books 2010) (1921); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
REASONING (rev. ed. 1962) (1949). 
 
3
 Much of the argument below would apply as well to a wide range of non-constitutional 
questions, but the scope of the discussion herein is limited, largely for the sake of sheer 
manageability. 
 
4
 This Article does not attempt to sort out proper from improper methods of constitutional 
interpretation.  However, at a minimum, we do not approve of a constitutional outcome, or a 
judicial explanation for such an outcome, that is indefensible as a matter of constitutional law, 
even if there is both an intent to promote one or more of the cardinal virtues, and the cardinal 
virtues are in fact thereby promoted.  This Article assumes, to begin with, merely that 
attending to one or more of the cardinal virtues can, at one stage or another, be a permissible 
consideration in important constitutional adjudication.  The Article need not, and does not, 
endorse the idea of courts, or governments in general, adopting some controversial view of the 
role of the cardinal virtues in good lives, and seeking to coercively impose that favored view 
on the public.  See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text. 
 
5
 To the extent constitutional adjudication was to focus on virtues and vices, it could be 
described as ‘aretaic.’  For brief contemporary introductions to aretaic or virtue ethics in 
general, see, e.g., Julia Annas, Virtue Ethics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY 
ch. 18 (David Copp ed., 2007); Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed. 2007), available at 
http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue (last visited February 20, 2011).  For 
classic accounts of virtue ethics, and of the role of the four cardinal virtues in particular, see 
ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (David Ross trans., 1925) (J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson 
rev. trans., 1980) (Oxford World’s Classics ed.) (~350 B.C.E.); MARCUS AURELIUS, 
MEDITATIONS (Martin Hammond trans., Penguin ed. 2006) (~172); Thomas Aquinas, Treatise 
on the Virtues, in SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, qq. 49-67 (John A. Oesterle trans., 1966) (Univ. 
of Notre Dame ed. 1984) (~1265-1274); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC pt. II, chs. XII, XIV; pt. IV, 
chs. XXXI-XXXII (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans., 1941) (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1990) 
(~360 B.C.E.).  For one contemporary treatment, see, e.g., JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL 
VIRTUES (Richard Winston et al. trans., 1966).  It should be noted that the four cardinal virtues 
do not appear to raise any obvious establishment clause, free exercise, or equal protection 
problems. 
 
6
 See discussion infra Parts III-IV. 
 
7
 See discussion infra Parts III-IV. 
 
8
 See discussion infra Parts III-IV. 
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and the virtue of justice9 as the sustained personal disposition to give everyone what 
is due and proper. 
For sheer manageability, our focus is on these four traditional cardinal virtues 
rather than more broadly on all of the many arguable virtues, whatever their 
importance.10  But in compensation, this Article discusses the cardinal virtues, or 
how they lack, at two levels.  This Article thus discusses the cardinal virtues as 
displayed, or not displayed, by judges themselves.  This Article crucially emphasizes 
the importance of the cardinal virtues as displayed, or not displayed, by broader 
groups of actors including the general public, partly in response to constitutional 
decisions.11 
This Article discusses the cardinal virtues in the context of various specific 
historical constitutional cases.12  Collectively, the cases justify increased judicial 
attention to the cardinal virtues, as an important element of constitutional decision-
making, without improperly distorting the process of adjudication.13 
The judicial cases themselves, however, should not bear the entire burden of 
justifying a more significant role for the cardinal virtues in constitutional 
adjudication.  The value of the cardinal virtues, collectively and individually, has 
frequently been discussed by philosophers and social critics.14  To help make the 
                                                          
 
9
 See discussion infra Parts III-IV.  The four cardinal virtues do not operate in isolation 
from one another; we shall note throughout some overlaps and relationships. 
 
10
 To try as well to account for the constitutional role of virtues—or at least arguable 
virtues—such as honesty and integrity; generosity; patience; humility; loyalty; compassion or 
caring (beyond the cardinal virtue of justice); benevolence; detachment; chastity; ambition or 
the lack thereof; punctuality; creativity; magnanimity; reliability; modesty; determination; 
curiosity; meekness or assertiveness; gentleness; adaptability; cleanliness; mercifulness (as 
tempering justice); and diligence, to name but a few possibilities, would obviously be beyond 
what is reasonably possible herein.  For a well-researched compilation of a number of widely 
respected virtues, see CHRISTOPHER PETERSON & MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, CHARACTER 
STRENGTHS AND VIRTUES: A HANDBOOK AND CLASSIFICATION (2004).  For the broader 
contemporary debate over whether there really are any stable character traits, see J. M. Doris, 
Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics, 32 NOÛS 504 (1998); Gilbert Harman, The 
Nonexistence of Character Traits, 100 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 223 
(2000).  See also STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 
(1974).  For more stable character-friendly views, see ROBERT M. ADAMS, A THEORY OF 
VIRTUE: EXCELLENCE IS BEING FOR THE GOOD 115-70 (2006); Joel J. Kupperman, The 
Indispensability of Character, 76 PHIL. 239 (2001); James Montmarquet, Moral Character 
and Social Science Research, 78 PHIL. 355 (2003). 
 
11
 Groups might display any of the cardinal virtues to a greater or lesser degree in response 
to constitutional decisions in light of threats or rewards and incentives as affected by those 
decisions.  A group might show increased self-control in response to a judicial decision that 
does not itself display exceptional self-control, or perhaps any other virtue.  And a group 
might display greater self-control because a judicial decision displayed not that particular 
cardinal virtue, the way bravery might inspire bravery in others, but the virtue of wisdom with 
respect to the public’s well-being.  Thus judicial wisdom, or sound practical judgment, might 
increase the rewards of citizen self-control. 
 
12
 See discussion infra Part III. 
 
13
 See supra note 4. 
 
14
 See infra Parts II, IV. 
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case for greater attention to the cardinal virtues in constitutional adjudication, this 
Article draws upon some highlights of that broader discussion with special attention 
to issues of great contemporary importance.15 
To set the stage for discussing the judicial cases, though, it will be useful to have 
some very general initial sense of the possible roles, limits, and values of basic 
virtues and virtue theory in adjudication.  It is to that initial stage-setting that this 
Article now turns. 
II.  THE VIRTUES AND JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING: A FEW PRELIMINARIES 
The influence of virtue theory within ethics and jurisprudence has not been 
constant over time.  Some years ago, the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe noted in 
particular that “[a]nyone who has read Aristotle’s [virtue] Ethics and has also read 
modern moral philosophy must have been struck by the great contrasts between 
them.”16  The extent to which theorists, judges, and the broader public think in terms 
of the cardinal virtues is subject to change over time.  Merely for the sake of its 
suggestiveness, rather than to definitively prove anything in particular, consider a bit 
of casual research based on Google Labs data.17 
Apparently, English-language book references to the four cardinal virtues have 
involved detectable trends over the past three hundred years.  References to 
‘courage’ over that time have been remarkably stable,18 and references to 
‘temperance’ have also been stable, at lower rates.19  References to ‘wisdom’ appear 
to peak sharply in the period from 1800 to 1830, and then gradually decline until 
about 1940, at which point such references more or less stabilize.20  The word (not 
necessarily in its ‘virtue’ sense) ‘justice’ roughly parallels the use of ‘wisdom,’ but 
at higher levels after 1800,.21  Until 1800, ‘courage’ was more commonly referred to 
than ‘justice,’22 but the use of the word ‘justice’ (in whatever sense) spiked 
                                                          
 
15
 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  While our focus will be primarily on the 
American constitutional context, basic concerns for cardinal virtues such as temperance, 
practical wisdom, and personal justice are arguably starting to become increasingly prominent 
elsewhere.  See, e.g., ED HOWKER & SHIV MALIK, JILTED GENERATION: HOW BRITAIN HAS 
BANKRUPTED ITS YOUTH (2010); MAGGIE JACKSON, DISTRACTED: THE EROSION OF ATTENTION 
AND THE COMING DARK AGE (2009). 
 
16
 G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHIL. 1, 1 (1958), reprinted in 
VIRTUE ETHICS 26 (Roger Crisp & Michael Slote eds., 1997). 
 
17
 See Ngram Viewer, GOOGLE LABS BOOKS, http://www.ngrams.googlelabs.com/graph? 
(last visited Dec. 29, 2010) (on file with the author).  The Ngram Viewer allows for a 
simultaneous search for and plotting of “justice, wisdom, courage, temperance” over various 
times periods.  The user is incited to experiment, and to attempt to explain any detectable 
trends. See id. 
 
18
 See id. 
 
19
 See id. 
 
20
 See id. 
 
21
 See id. Obviously, ‘justice’ may be used in a wide variety of senses, even within 
jurisprudence and ethics, with no direct reference to justice as a personal virtue. 
 
22
 See id. 
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dramatically around 180023 before gradually trending downward from 1830 to 1950, 
at which point references to ‘justice’ fluctuate or, of late, trend upward.24  None of 
the four cardinal virtue words is as prominent in this database as it was in 1820.25 
It may well be that virtue ethics in general has been long-neglected,26 but also the 
subject of a relatively recent revival.27  Our focus is, however, not on any recent 
popularity of virtue ethics,28 but on its possible contributions to constitutional 
jurisprudence in our day.  And there is certainly reason to suspect that fully 
legitimate attention to the virtues—and to the four cardinal virtues in particular—
could be of genuine value in resolving and justifying constitutional cases. 
At a very general level, it is reasonable to argue that the virtues and good 
government reciprocally bring each other into clearer focus.  Professor Ronald 
Dworkin, interpreting Aristotle’s classic virtue theory, makes this argument.  
Crucially, Professor Dworkin, following Aristotle, holds that “[w]e understand good 
government better by better understanding happiness and the virtues, which good 
government fosters.”29  
A broadly liberal form of government, including the judiciary, need not vainly 
seek to be neutral as among all basic forms of virtue and vice, including injustice, 
thoughtlessness, smugness, and narcissism, for example.30  And if a broadly liberal 
government, including its judiciary in constitutional cases, may seek within limits to 
                                                          
 
23
 See id. 
 
24
 See id. 
 
25
 See id. 
 
26
 See, e.g., Michael Slote, Virtue Ethics, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO ETHICAL THEORY 
325 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2000). 
 
27
 See id. (tracing the revival of interest in virtue ethics to G.E.M. Anscombe, supra note 
16). 
 
28
 See id. 
 
29
 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 188 (2011) (emphasis added). Professor 
Dworkin then adds that the Aristotelian virtues are better understood by “asking which 
personal qualities make for good citizenship in the kind of state we assume to be good.”  Id. 
 
30
 For the possibility of a broadly liberal judiciary focused on a range of judicial virtues in 
a wide variety of cases, see Judith Resnik, Reading Reinhardt: The Work of Constructing 
Legal Virtue (Exempla Iustitiae), 120 YALE L.J. 539, 568 (2010) (referring to judicial 
facticity, patience with nuance, thoroughness, preparedness, optimism, and concern for justice 
for all persons); Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 91-92 (2006).  For 
discussion of thoughtlessness and smugness in particular as matters of character, see THOMAS 
HURKA, VIRTUE, VICE, AND VALUE 95 (2001). 
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contribute toward changing behaviors,31 then virtues and vices may to some degree32 
be ultimately affected as well.  Changes in behavior can lead to changes in values.33 
Should government, including a clearly limited and fallible judiciary, ever really 
consider matters of even the most elemental virtues and vices?  Given the priority of 
individual liberty and autonomy, we may face problems involving34 the cultivation 
of popular virtue and vice.  With typical insightfulness, Alexis de Tocqueville noted 
one persistent such problem.  Tocqueville noticed “[d]emocracy’s difficulty in 
conquering the passions and silencing momentary requirements in the interests of the 
future . . . .  The people, surrounded by flatterers, find it hard to master themselves.  
Whenever anyone tries to accept a privation or a discomfort, even for an aim that 
reason approves, they always begin by refusing.”35 
Such a collective inability to endure modest short-term discomfort necessary for 
more important long-term goals might well indicate a deficiency of the relevant 
public virtue,36 as well as a serious public policy problem calling for some sort of 
appropriate, prudent governmental response.  Writing specifically of the problem of 
self-control in our own day, Daniel Akst sensibly concludes that “while we can do 
better, we can’t do it alone.  Willpower by itself won’t get the job done without the 
                                                          
 
31
 See, e.g., the behavioral changes required by the underlying statute and the 
constitutional decisions in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) and 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (constitutionally upholding federal legislation 
prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations in interstate commerce). 
 
32
 For a broader discussion, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS 
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008); LEVERAGING THE LAW:  USING COURTS TO 
ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE (David A. Schultz ed., 1998). 
 
33
 One writer on virtues and vices reminds us that  
This notion that gradually the inner man conforms to the outer . . . has been 
experimentally supported.  As Albert Bandura . . . states: “If people behave in new 
ways, eventually their attitudes change in the direction of their actions.  Indeed, 
numerous studies have shown that one of the most effective methods for altering 
attitudes and values is by producing a change in behavior.” 
SOLOMON SCHIMMEL, THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS 109 (1997) (quoting ALBERT BANDURA, 
AGGRESSION: A SOCIAL LEARNING ANALYSIS 257 (1973)). 
 
34
 This is not to suggest that problems of national character—or of virtue and vice—do not 
have one or more causes rooted in economics, hierarchy, cultural institutions, and other 
sources.  Doubtless they do.  But this does not show that national problems should always be 
judicially addressed at the deepest causal levels, and never as well at the level of changing 
individual or group behavior, or individual and group virtue and vice.  See supra note 33. 
 
35
 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 224 (J.P. Mayer, ed., George 
Lawrence, trans., 1969). 
 
36
 Id.  Tocqueville’s example involves only an initial, rather than a sustained, rejection of 
necessary sacrifice.  Such a sustained rejection could indicate a greater deficiency of the 
relevant public virtue.  There is no reason to suppose that from its founding until its historical 
conclusion, a political society can never vary in the degree to which it possesses or displays 
any of the cardinal virtues.  Societies, as well as persons, can presumably grow, or diminish, 
over time in any of the cardinal virtues.  Of course, societies may also merely appear to have 
grown or diminished in a virtue because their circumstances have become more or less trying 
in relevant respects. 
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help of institutions—a sensible legal framework and strong social connections.”37  
Akst then recognizes the possible role for constitutions in particular in legitimately 
discouraging some departures from basic public virtues.38 
One might still wonder, though, whether there can be any legitimate role for 
considering even basic virtues in constitutional cases.  In any interesting and 
complex constitutional case, courts will typically have a range of rules, tests, 
principles, doctrines, and policies at their disposal,39 and some of the tests will 
themselves allow for sensible and prudent judicial judgment and for flexibility in 
application and outcome.40 
The real answer to this question as to the role of virtue-thinking must depend 
partly on a sample of actual cases discussed briefly below,41 in the context of the 
four cardinal virtues, in themselves, and in social context.42  But we should consider 
the possibility that whatever their rigidity or flexibility, the various rules, tests, 
principles, doctrines, and policies themselves cannot always provide an 
unimprovable response and rationale in constitutional cases.  Neither rules nor 
considerations of virtues will always be self-selecting or determinate in dictating 
constitutional outcomes and rationales.43  But as we shall see, considerations of 
virtue, undertaken in accord with the cardinal virtue of prudence or practical 
wisdom,44 may usefully supplement other elements of constitutional decision-
making. 
To open the door to judicial consideration of virtue, we can adapt a claim the 
philosopher John McDowell has made in discussing Aristotle’s virtue ethics: 
“Occasion by occasion, one knows what to do, if one does, not by applying universal 
principles but by being a certain kind of person: one who sees situations in a certain 
                                                          
 
37
 DANIEL AKST, WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY: SELF-CONTROL IN AN AGE OF EXCESS 14 
(2011) (emphasis added). 
 
38
 See id. at 243. 
 
39
 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 
40
 Consider, for example, the three part Lemon test; the endorsement test; and the coercion 
test utilized by a chronically divided Supreme Court in Establishment Clause cases.  See, e.g., 
the various opinions in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 
545 U.S. 844 (2005); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 
41
 See discussion infra Parts III-IV. 
 
42
 See discussion infra Parts III-IV. 
 
43
 Even if a rule is thought to be universalist or absolute within its proper scope, we must 
still decide, in part on the basis of prudence or practical wisdom, how to limit the proper scope 
and elements of the rule.  We must still decide, for example, what counts as “speech” for free 
speech purposes.  See, e.g., R. George Wright, What Counts as ‘Speech’ in the First Place?: 
Determining the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217 (2010). 
 
44
 For an emphasis on wisdom in a broad, inclusive, aspirational sense, but with a 
subordinate emphasis on a number of virtues that must be present in a reasonably stable, 
broadly liberal society, see ROBERT KANE, ETHICS AND THE QUEST FOR WISDOM 256 (2010) 
(citing in particular “honesty, respect, responsibility, fairness, trustworthiness, and caring” as 
virtues necessary for a healthy polity) (emphasis omitted). 
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distinctive way.  And there is no dislodging . . . questions about the nature and . . . 
the acquisition of virtue.”45 
We need not make so ambitious a claim, though.  Constitutional adjudicators can 
certainly pay primary attention to rules and the like; our interest is merely in a 
genuinely useful supplementary role for attention to the virtues.  And the persons 
doing the “seeing”46 of and through virtue include not just the judges, but broader 
groups as well, including the general public. 
The less ambitious, but important, role for attention to the virtues in adjudication 
is more accurately captured by virtue ethicist Rosalind Hursthouse.  Professor 
Hursthouse argues generally, but in a way we can adopt, that a certain amount of 
virtue and corresponding moral or practical wisdom (phronesis) might be required 
both to interpret the (moral or legal) rules and to determine which rule was most 
appropriately to be applied in a particular case.47 
Other views suggest that rules and principles constitute merely one side of the 
proverbial coin, with the virtues constituting the other side of the coin, and with a 
virtuous person being merely one who never violates the rules and principles.48  We 
need not, however, so closely identify rules with virtues, any more than we should 
suggest that virtues should simply replace rules. 
One way of distinguishing a useful role for the virtues might involve posing a 
hypothetical question.  Let us suppose that we must entrust the well-being of a 
vulnerable person we care about, Minor, to one of two very similar adults, Nomos or 
Prudence.  Nomos and Prudence as two persons have similar knowledge and 
experiences, equal intelligence, and they accept, with equal sincerity, identical moral 
rules, principles, doctrines, and policies. 
We could stipulate to all this, and still have rational grounds for preferring to 
entrust Minor to the care of either Nomos or Prudence over the other.  Differences 
between Nomos and Prudence in the relevant basic moral virtues, crucially, are not 
entirely ruled out by the above stipulations.  Nomos, for example, might be well-
intentioned, but, even in Nomos’ own eyes, lamentably “weak-willed,” or likely to 
give in to temptation.  Prudence, let us suppose, in sharp contrast, has an established 
track record of somehow minimizing the personal appeal of temptation, or of success 
in resisting temptations when they arise. 
In such a case, it would hardly be arbitrary of us to entrust Minor specifically to 
Prudence, rather than to Nomos, despite the many important respects, including the 
sincerely held principles, in which they are identical.  To do the opposite, on the 
facts stipulated, would actually be irresponsible, and indeed unreasonable, on our 
part.  And we can reach this preference for Prudence over Nomos even as we 
                                                          
 
45
 JOHN MCDOWELL, Virtue and Reason, in ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS: CRITICAL ESSAYS 120, 
140 (Nancy Sherman ed., 1999).  For a broader treatment of a related ‘particularism’ in ethics, 
see JONATHAN DANCY, ETHICS WITHOUT PRINCIPLES (2004); MORAL PARTICULARISM (Brad 
Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little eds., 2001); R. George Wright, Dreams and Formulas: The 
Roles of Particularism and Principlism in the Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 195 (2009). 
 
46
 See MCDOWELL, supra note 45, at 140. 
 47  ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS 40 (1999). 
 
48
 See DAMIEN KEOWN, BUDDHIST ETHICS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 12-13 (2005). 
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recognize that the virtues do not, individually or jointly, invariably point the virtuous 
decision-maker in some unique, single determinate direction.49 
We thus have, at a minimum, some initial grounds for a reasonable hope that 
proper attention to the virtues, and to the basic cardinal virtues in particular, may be 
of significant assistance in deciding, elaborating upon, and justifying constitutional 
decisions.  But let us move on to critique a small sampling of the actual historical 
constitutional cases on that assumption, as a matter of further evidence. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW AND THE CARDINAL VIRTUES:  SOME 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
The cardinal virtues are, again, classically assumed to include courage, 
temperance or proper self-restraint, justice as a personal virtue, and perhaps most 
broadly and crucially, the virtue of practical wisdom.50  We need not explore the 
extent to which any two or all of these virtues are linked, or even inseparable.51  
Based on the few actual judicial examples we briefly consider below, however, it is 
reasonable to suppose that each of these virtues, especially practical wisdom, is often 
found in proximity to one or more of the others.  A judicial decision displaying or 
promoting one often displays or promotes another.  It is, however, also reasonable to 
imagine, based on our case selection, that a judicial decision displaying or promoting 
one basic vice may well display or promote the same or one or more other basic 
vices. 
Most importantly, for our purposes, though, the cases below illustrate that in 
constitutional adjudication, the presence or absence of one or more cardinal virtues, 
in the judicial decision-maker or among some affected public, can be important in 
ways that are not fully captured by attention to rules, tests, principles, doctrines, or 
policies. 
A.  Courage and the Constitution 
It is fair to say that freedom of speech law in particular focuses on rules and 
judicial tests.52  But it has been recognized that freedom of speech is also about the 
particular cardinal virtue of courage, or the lack thereof.  The judicial rules and tests 
applied in free speech cases may affect the capacity of the public to resist a “chill” or 
to display personal and civic courage.  Free speech jurisprudence may reflect the 
courage, or lack thereof, of both the public and the judiciary.  In any event, free 
speech jurisprudence is in a practical sense interwoven with courage, or its lack, in 
                                                          
 
49
 Philosopher Christine Swanton points out not only that different particular virtues, by 
themselves, may point us in different directions, but that virtue ethics in general can hardly 
offer us a complete escape from problems of indeterminacy in decision-making.  See 
CHRISTINE SWANTON, VIRTUE ETHICS: A PLURALISTIC VIEW 275, 291 (2003).  Of course, an 
ethical or constitutional decision-maker who takes an interest in the virtues is hardly bound to 
consult only her character or conscience; such a decision-maker is, as a matter of the virtue of 
practical wisdom, bound to engage in consultation and dialogue on a proper basis.  See id. at 
295. 
 
50
 See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. 
 
51
 The unity or lack of unity of all the cardinal virtues, in one sense or another, is an issue 
that we need not address.  The realistic significance, in important constitutional contexts, of 
the cardinal virtues (and their opposites) is instead our primary concern. 
 
52
 See, e.g., the sampling referred to supra note 1. 
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important ways not reducible to the rules or tests themselves.  But we should not 
invariably equate a judicial finding of constitutionally protected speech with a 
display of genuine judicial courage; this may vary with context. 
The most widely celebrated linkage of free speech and the virtue of courage is 
that of Justice Brandeis, concurring in the case of Whitney v. California.53  Justice 
Brandeis begins with the broad assertion that the constitutional Framers “believed 
liberty to [be] the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.”54  The 
meaning of the word “secret” may not be precisely clear.  It may not be clear 
whether the meaning of “secret” in both instances above is intended to be the same.  
But Brandeis does briefly elaborate on speech itself and the problem of fear, or 
irrational fear, as the presumed opposite of the virtue of courage. 
Justice Brandeis thus argues that by itself, “[f]ear of serious injury cannot alone 
justify suppression of free speech and assembly.  Men feared witches and burnt 
women.  It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational 
fears.”55  Apart from instances in which the speech imminently threatens a serious 
harm,56 supposedly harmful political speech should prompt us to address and rebut 
such speech on the merits.  Our courage in legally permitting such speech is 
bolstered by our confidence in the relevance and power, over time, of counter-
speech.57 
Thus on the Brandeis view, courage inspires protecting speech that some would 
regard as dangerous.  This courage is directly displayed by the judges deciding the 
free speech cases in question.  But over the long term, that judicial courage must be 
supported by some degree of courage, or admiration for courage, within elements of 
the broader public.  The public’s own courage may have been reinforced, or partly 
inspired, by judicial courage.  The necessary judicial and broader civic courage may 
actually sustain one another in a “virtuous circle.”  And judicial and citizen courage 
in tolerating potentially dangerous speech may be strengthened and confirmed when 
the feared consequences of such speech do not come to pass.58 
This is certainly an important lesson on the relationships between constitutional 
free speech cases and the judicial and civic virtue of courage.59  There are of course 
                                                          
 
53
 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), 
overruled on other grounds, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 
54
 Id. at 375 (emphasis added). 
 
55
 Id. at 376. 
 
56
 See id. 
 
57
 See id. at 377 (explicitly contrasting cowardice with the virtue of courage among the 
American Revolutionaries). 
 
58
 Consider, e.g., the circumstances and consequences in the racially charged rhetoric case 
of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  Of course, some political speech cases are 
controversial for reasons best conceived in terms other than that of a public fear of future bad 
public consequences, and the courage or lack of courage to manage those fears.  See, e.g., the 
military funeral protest case of Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 
59
 For further discussion, see Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character, 46 UCLA 
L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1999).  From a slightly different angle, consider also Professor Blasi’s 
classic argument that free speech jurisprudence should be crafted with special attention to 
those eras in which the literal courage of our convictions, and our sense of security, is at its 
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some inherent practical limitations at work.  The virtue of courage often depends, for 
example, upon the distinct cardinal virtue of practical wisdom or prudence.60  And 
the real practical value of judicial courage over time may well depend upon the 
guiding virtue of judicial practical wisdom, as in a number of the classic civil rights 
and equal protection adjudications.61 
More controversially, though, we should ask whether judicial courage in 
deciding and explaining free speech cases always tends to support the speaker.  The 
twentieth century association between free speech and courage, especially in 
political dissent, wartime, and subversive advocacy cases,62 may inadvertently tend 
to actually inhibit courageous re-thinking in some free speech contexts. 
Consider, for example, a case of repeated verbal condemnations of vulnerable 
adolescents in a public school setting that may not allow for voluntarily avoiding the 
perhaps targeted message.  Suppose a court was to uphold such public school student 
expression as constitutionally protected speech.  Would it be clear, in every such 
instance, that upholding free speech requires greater judicial courage than allowing 
its reasonable regulation based on a controversial willingness to carefully work 
through the relevant interests at stake, including those of the speakers, their future 
selves, the “targets,” other students, and the community and public at large?63 
In some free speech cases, judicial courage may potentially take more than one 
form, and discerning the most valuable form of judicial courage may require unusual 
practical wisdom.  Consider as well the case of “animal cruelty speech” in general.64  
The more that upholding controversial speech is celebrated as courageous, at least in 
the relevant circles, the less real courage is required, paradoxically, to uphold such 
speech.  On the other hand, professional courage among federal judges might be 
actually required to resist assimilating an animal cruelty video to protected speech, 
even where the free speech challenge focuses largely on over breadth grounds.65 
                                                          
lowest ebb, and the impulse to suppress dissent is at its strongest.  See Vincent Blasi, The 
Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985). 
 
60
 Some uncontrolled fears are unreasonable, and might be diminished by the exercise of 
practical wisdom.  The virtue of courage may be transformed into the vice of foolhardiness or 
rashness if one impulsively decides to run into a brick wall, rather than merely walk through a 
nearby door.  On the other hand, one probably still displays real courage—if pointlessly, or 
even foolishly—if one’s lack of practical wisdom leads one to imagine that one is confronting 
serious danger when no such danger really exists. 
 
61
 For important examples of this combination, see generally JACK BASS, TAMING THE 
STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR., AND THE SOUTH’S FIGHT OVER 
CIVIL RIGHTS (2003). 
 
62
 See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 
(Jamie Kalven ed., 1988); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 
FROM THE SEDITION ACT TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004). 
 
63
 For a useful starting point, see the various opinions in Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. 
Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), reh’g en banc denied, 455 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2006), 
vacated, 549 U.S. 262 (2007). 
 
64
 See, in one particular context, United States v. Stevens, 130 U.S. 1577 (2010) 
(criminalizing commercial depictions of animal cruelty). 
 
65
 See id. 
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The deepest and most valuable form of judicial courage in a range of free speech 
cases, however, might be of a different sort.  Such courage might set aside the appeal 
of being thought courageous for championing free speech, and, with due judicial 
modesty and humility, ask whether any of the basic reasons66 for constitutionally 
enshrining free speech in the first place are distinctively present in the case, even if 
upholding the speech would somehow seem generally libertarian or broad-minded. 
Or consider, for example, the opportunity to display some form of judicial 
courage in some of the violent video game cases,67 or in the commercial nude 
dancing cases.68  In these and a variety of pornography cases,69 a cynic might suggest 
that the number of the court’s references to works of classic literature is sometimes 
proportional to the court’s desire to verbally “distance” itself from the unseemly 
“expression” in question.  Courts may cite a dozen classic works incorporating 
verbal depictions of violence.  But having done so, they often do not then much 
reflect on whether the basic reasons for protecting speech70 are really distinctly at 
stake in the case.  In some cases, where the activity involved has little to do with 
meaningful speech, such reflection might require a kind of cognitive or professional 
courage. 
More broadly, free speech cases, along with some of the classic civil rights and 
equal protection cases, even as decided by independent Article III federal judges,71 
may thus hinge on forms of judicial courage and fortitude.  We must, however, also 
remember that more judicial courage, even of the right kind, is not necessarily better.  
Judicial courage should be informed by, and occasionally tempered by, the cardinal 
virtue of judicial prudence or practical wisdom.72 
                                                          
 
66
 See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION (1st ed. 1970); Kent 
Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989) (with the standard 
emphasis on the pursuit of social truth, autonomous self-realization, effective political 
democracy, and related concerns). 
 
67
 See, e.g., Judge Posner’s opinion in American Amusement Machine Ass’n v. Kendrick, 
244 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 2001), and much more broadly, Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. 
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs.  
Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 
68
 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991).  The plurality 
opinion virtually begins by declaring that respondent “Miller wishes to dance nude because 
she believes she would make more money doing so.”  Id. at 563.  This of course fails to 
distinguish her purported speech, and its message or motivation, from virtually any purely 
commercial transaction itself. 
 
69
 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (virtual child 
pornography case). 
 
70
 See supra notes 66, 68.  Again, with respect to some general citizen audiences, little 
judicial courage would be required to uphold a particular regulation of, say, purely virtual 
child pornography.  See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 235. But with respect to other audiences, a kind 
of courage and fortitude might be required if a court were to appear to lend aid and comfort to 
censorious groups by upholding a regulation of what is claimed to be ‘speech’ within the 
meaning of the first amendment. 
 
71
 For useful discussion of some complications of “judicial independence,” see, for 
example Sanford Levinson, Identifying “Independence,” 86 B.U. L. REV. 1297, 1299 (2006); 
Pamela S. Karlan, Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1044 (2007). 
 
72
 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
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Arguably, the classic constitutional example of the occasional need to balance 
the virtues of courage and practical wisdom is the Court’s decision in Ex Parte 
McCardle.73  In McCardle, the Court declined to decide on the merits74 of a habeas 
corpus case that had been briefed and argued before the Court before Congress 
repealed the jurisdictional statute on which McCardle had relied,75 while not also 
repealing an alternative jurisdictional ground.76  Under the circumstances, including 
the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson by the Reconstruction Era 
Congress,77 the Court’s discretion might indeed have been the better part of valor.  
Or in our terms, any lack of valor on the Court’s part might have been outweighed 
by the value of the Court’s surviving, intact and unimpaired, to fight another day, in 
accordance with the virtue of prudence and practical wisdom. 
B.  Constitutional Temperance and Prudence in and Beyond the Courts 
We have already referred to prudence or practical wisdom as guiding and 
limiting the virtue of courage.78  While wisdom, and judicial wisdom in particular, 
occupy a position of special prominence, wisdom itself suggests that courts should 
often decline to second-guess the practical wisdom of congressional79 or expert 
administrative agency80 policy judgments.  Here, we briefly consider the wisdom, or 
lack thereof, of judicial constitutional response to problems of temperance, or of 
reasonable self-control and self-restraint, on the part of actors beyond the courts. 
It is difficult to deny that many important federal and state-level political 
decisions involve exercising, or failure to exercise, temperance in the sense of 
reasonable self-control, or appropriate self-restraint, as distinct from self-indulgence, 
self-absorption, or unreasonable discounting of the more distant future.81  The ‘self’ 
                                                          
 
73
 Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868). 
 
74
 Id. at 514. 
 
75
 Id. 
 
76
 Id. (evidently referring to Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 
81).  For classic discussion, see William W. VanAlstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte 
McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229 (1973).  More broadly, see Douglas E. Edlin, A 
Constitutional Right to Judicial Review: Access to Courts and Ouster Clauses in England and 
the United States, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 80-84 (2009). 
 
77
 See VanAlstyne, supra note 76. 
 
78
 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
 
79
 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003). The Court often disavows any re-writing 
of dubious congressional policy, in the belief that it “is not within our province to second-
guess” the “wisdom of Congress’ action.”  Id.  See also Harbison v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1481, 
1493-94 (2009); Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1217 (2009); Clinton v. New York, 524 
U.S. 417, 447 (1998); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). 
 
80
 This is the basic logic of the “second step” of the major case Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.,  v. 
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984), in which a reviewing court is generally to defer to any 
reasonable and permissible agency interpretation of a statutory term, despite possible judicial 
reservations as to the wisdom of the agency’s interpretation. 
 
81
 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
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in self-indulgence may refer here to an individual person, or to groups at various 
levels.82 
Determining what counts as intemperate behavior may of course require the 
virtue of practical wisdom.  Deciding whether to do anything about one’s 
intemperance, and if so, precisely what, similarly may require practical wisdom.  
And the virtue of practical wisdom will likely be required as well of a court when 
constitutionally adjudicating another branch of government’s attempts to address that 
branch’s own intemperance. 
Let us consider a judicial constitutional example.  It is not difficult to see the 
Court’s opinion in Bowsher v. Synar83 as a response to Congress’ recognizing its 
own intemperance in the context of federal budget deficit spending, borrowing, 
taxing, public indebtedness, and re-election.84  In Bowsher, Congress had established 
a role for the Comptroller General in reducing annual federal budget deficits by 
sequestering appropriated funds, pursuant to statutory guidelines.85  Though the 
Comptroller General was relatively well insulated from congressional removal,86 the 
Bowsher majority found him to be an agent of Congress.87  The majority then 
formalistically determined the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings statute to involve the 
execution of the law by an agent of Congress,88 and therefore to be 
unconstitutional.89 
The Court in Bowsher thus found itself in the position of characterizing the 
Gramm- Rudman-Hollings statute as a classic90 congressional “power-grab;” as an 
attempt by Congress to aggrandize its own authority at the expense of the executive 
                                                          
 
82
 Thus while we might think of some individual person as self-indulgent or as heavily 
discounting the longer-term future, it is often much more helpful to think of particular groups, 
or an entire culture, in these terms.  See infra Part III. 
 
83
 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 714. 
 
84
 The statute in question was popularly known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, Pub. L. No. 
99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985) (codified as amended variously in U.S.C. titles 2, 31 & 42).  The 
idea of making a self-binding precommitment as a response to one’s own perceived 
intemperance is discussed in JON ELSTER’s, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN 
RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36-111 (rev. ed. 1984).  For application of the 
precommitment idea, in the face of predictably overwhelming future temptations to sacrifice 
the greater long-term well-being, see R. George Wright, The Modern Separation of Powers: 
Would James Madison Have Untied Ulysses?, 18 CUMB. L. REV. 69 (1987).  For broader 
discussion, see, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1105 (1999). 
 
85
 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 717-18.  Congressional intemperance, on one theory, had become 
serious enough to prompt a correspondingly serious attempt at reducing its consequences, but 
had not yet progressed to a point at which Congress was incapable of serious attempts at self-
correction.  In some cases, intemperance may even become so severe as to diminish the will 
for appropriate self-correction.   
 
86
 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 759, 765, 773 (White, J., dissenting). 
 
87
 Id. at 726. 
 
88
 Id. 
 
89
 Id. 
 
90
 See, THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 at 251-52 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003). 
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branch.  And in a formalistic way, the logic of the Court majority, on its own terms, 
is faultless. 
But in order to find the majority’s logic more deeply convincing, we must ignore 
the realistic insulation of the Comptroller General from congressional dismissal.91  
We must also ignore the realistic costs to Congress of dismissing the very actor 
Congress had designated to save itself from its own intemperate budgeting for short-
term re-electability.92  Most fundamentally, we must fail to see the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings statue as an implicit admission of Congress’ intemperate inability to 
restrain its own individual and collective impulses to spend improvidently.93 
The point is not that if the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings statute had been upheld, the 
federal deficit and indebtedness picture would today look substantially different.  
Rather, the point is that the Bowsher Court majority saw only a fragment of the 
overall picture, and ignored important elements of institutional virtue and vice on the 
part of Congress.  In this respect, it is fair to ask whether the Court majority itself 
displayed much of the cardinal virtue of practical wisdom. 
There are traces of some elements of the Bowsher majority as well in the 
subsequent Line Item Veto Act94 case of Clinton v. New York.95  Clinton involved a 
constitutional separation of powers challenge to the Act.  The basic idea of the Act 
was to give the President some limited, overridable authority96 to veto appropriations 
found by the President to increase the federal deficit while being inessential to the 
national interest.97  The Clinton majority noted that the Act allowed for presidential 
veto of portions of bills, as opposed to entire bills, thus allowing the President to, in 
effect, amend a bill as well as to veto the bill.98  On this basis, the majority held the 
Act unconstitutional as violative of the Presentment Clause.99 
The Clinton Court characterized the familiar constitutional veto mechanism as a 
“‛finely wrought’ procedure.”100  If we place ourselves in the position of the 
                                                          
 
91
 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 759, 765, 773 (White, J., dissenting). 
 
92
 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 
93
 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.  For classic recognition of the general 
differences between short and long term personal and public interests, and the need for 
governmental institutions to bring these interests into alignment, see DAVID HUME, A 
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. III, pt. II, sec. VII (L. A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditcth eds. 
1978) (1740).  Much of books II and III in general are devoted to what Hume terms ‘the 
passions,’ and to a wide range of virtues and vices.  Id. at bks. II, III. 
 
94
 Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (Supp. II 
1997)). 
 
95
 Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447 (1998).  For general discussion, see Glen O. 
Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 VA. L. REV. 403 (1988); Matthew 
Thomas Kline, The Line Item Veto Case and the Separation of Powers, 88 CAL. L. REV. 181 
(2000). 
 
96
 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436-37. 
 
97
 Id. at 436. 
 
98
 Id. at 438. 
 
99
 Id. at 421 (citing U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2). 
 
100
 Id. at 447. 
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constitutional Framers, there is indeed something unsettling about a presidential 
“veto” of merely “one provision in an Act that occupies 536 pages of the Statutes at 
Large.”101 
The problem, though, is that the Framers might have been unsettled not only by 
vetoing sections of a bill, but by the presentation of 536 pages of richly diverse 
legislative material as merely one single bill, to be either vetoed as a whole or signed 
as a whole by the President.  Depending upon matters of timing as well as content, a 
536 page omnibus bill might be realistically unvetoable, independent of its merits, in 
whole or in part.  One might well view the rise of massive, tome-like budget bills, to 
be vetoed or signed as a single unity, as the more dramatic shift in congressional-
presidential relations.  The Line Item Veto Act could, on this view, be considered as 
a consensual attempt to restore something closer to the separation of powers 
envisioned by the Framers. 
But for our purposes, the most important question is not one of formalistic line-
drawing, or even of the Framers’ expectations and intent.  It is instead a question that 
incorporates those considerations, but that focuses as well on the cardinal virtues, 
including apparent institutional intemperance as in Bowsher,102 practical wisdom on 
the part of all three branches, and as should have been clear even in 1998, the crucial 
virtue of justice between generations.103 
Consider, in this regard, the opinion in the Clinton case of Justice Kennedy, 
concurring rather than dissenting.104  While agreeing with the opinion for the Court, 
Justice Kennedy nonetheless begins his concurrence, startlingly, with these words: 
“A Nation cannot plunder its own treasury without putting its Constitution and its 
survival in peril.  The statute before us, then, is of first importance, for it seems 
undeniable the Act will tend to restrain persistent excessive spending.”105  Justice 
Kennedy thus appears, through his concurrence, to unfortunately hold open the 
possibility that contrary to frequent assertions,106 the Constitution may indeed be a 
suicide pact. 
Our point, though, is not to take sides on this issue, at least directly.  Instead, it is 
to encourage proper reflection upon and recourse to the virtues of temperance, 
practical wisdom, and (intergenerational) justice to avoid having to interpret the 
Constitution as an instrument of societal destruction.  Thus we do not recommend 
judicially or otherwise amending the Constitution for the sake of promoting the basic 
                                                          
 
101
 Id. at 430. 
 
102
 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. 
 
103
 See, e.g., THE GENERATIONAL EQUITY DEBATE (John B. Williamson et al. eds., 1999).  
More recently, see, e.g., Janna Thompson, Identity and Obligation in a Transgenerational 
Polity in INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE (Axel Grosseries & Lukas H. Meyer eds., 2009).  As 
with other important public and constitutional issues, we make no claim that justice between 
generations is entirely reducible to matters of justice as a virtue, in the sense of an enduring 
disposition to give everyone their due.  See discussion supra Part III and infra Part IV. 
 
104
 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 
105
 Id. 
 
106
 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309-10 (1981) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 
372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963)); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting); Doe v. Boland, 630 F.3d 491, 496 (6th Cir. 2011); Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 
F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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virtues.  We ask whether the Framers would have wanted the separation of powers 
doctrine to be interpreted to foster injustice between generations, gross continuing 
intemperance and improvidence in public budgeting, imprudence and lack of 
practical wisdom, and collective self-indulgence to the point of putting national 
survival “in peril.”107  It is difficult to accept imperiling constitutional or national 
survival as a guide to the Framers’ intent, or as an element of any other defensible 
approach to interpreting the Constitution. 
The results in Bowsher and in Clinton were not constitutionally inevitable, and 
could have been avoided, likely to the public well-being, by greater exercise of the 
cardinal virtues, including practical wisdom, and by greater judicial attention to the 
cardinal virtues in general.  This is not to say that the Court in this respect deserves 
blame, that hindsight has not clarified these matters, or that the judicial exercise of 
practical wisdom is usually effortless and uncontroversial. 
The point is rather that the effort to focus more meaningfully on the cardinal 
virtues is legitimate, worth making, and worth taking seriously.  As the philosopher 
Robert Kane has observed, “[a] good deal of what is called ‘practical wisdom’ . . . is 
knowing enough about ourselves and about others and the world around us to aptly 
choose which experiments in living are likely to be fulfilling and which are not.”108  
Greater judicial efforts along these lines may be difficult, but are practically 
essential.109 
C.  Justice as a Personal Virtue: Constitutional Responses to Personal Injustice 
As a cardinal virtue, justice involves a sustained disposition to give to everyone 
neither more nor less than is due.110  As private actors, we can exhibit this virtue, or 
its opposite, perhaps with one degree or another of state involvement.  Courts may 
find themselves assessing, at a constitutional level, alleged instances of the vice of 
injustice, again in a context of greater or lesser state involvement.  The provisions of 
a will, for example, may reflect the judgment of a private party.  But the drafting, 
execution, interpretation, and possible enforcement of a will, as officially determined 
to be valid or invalid, implicate the state to one degree or another. 
To pursue this example, we start with the general principle of broad testamentary 
freedom in the disposition of property.111  In particular, all else equal, “the right to 
make a testamentary disposition of property is fundamental, is most solemnly 
assured by law, and does not depend upon its judicious use.”112  The most extreme 
                                                          
 
107
 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  This phrase is of course borrowed 
from Justice Kennedy’s own characterization of the situation.  See supra note 106 and 
accompanying text. 
 
108
 ROBERT KANE, ETHICS AND THE QUEST FOR WISDOM 84-85 (2010). 
 
109
 For brief elaboration on what courts, and other actors, might do in this regard, see infra 
Part IV and note 171 and accompanying text. 
 
110
 See supra note 5. 
 
111
 Estate of Mowry, 107 Cal. App. 4th 338, 342 (2003) (“[T]he paramount concern in the 
construction of wills is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the testator, as far as 
possible.”) (“the freedom of testamentary disposition of property.”). 
 
112
 Estate of Della Sala, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 569, 572 (Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added).  See 
also Streight v. Estate of Streight, 360 P.2d 304 (Or. 1961). 
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
212 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:195 
 
such formulations of testamentary freedom set aside considerations of gratitude, as 
well as of justice, and of the “natural and legitimate claims upon [the testator’s] 
bounty.”113  The law may thus give effect to “an unequal and unjust disposition of 
[the testator’s] property.”114 
There are limits to such testamentary freedom.  Consider, for example, the 
dissenting opinion in the famous case of Riggs v. Palmer,115 involving a legatee who 
killed the testator to prevent the revocation of the testator’s will.  The dissenters 
appreciated that: 
[m]odern jurisprudence, in recognizing the right of the individual, under 
more or less restrictions, to dispose of his property after his death, 
subjects it to legislative control, both as to extent and as to mode of 
exercise.  Complete freedom of testamentary disposition of one’s property 
has not been and is not the universal rule.116 
At a minimum, sufficiently strong considerations of law and public policy can 
place limitations on the otherwise broad freedom to dispose of property unwisely, 
ungratefully, or unjustly.117  Even the most fervent defenses of testamentary freedom 
recognize something like this limitation: 
To wrest a man’s property from the person to whom he has given it, and 
to divert it to others from whom he has desired to withhold it, is a most 
violent injustice, amounting to nothing less than a post mortem robbery, 
which no court should sanction, unless thoroughly satisfied, either that the 
dispositions of the will are reprobated by law, or that the testator was 
legally incapable to make a will.118 
Inescapably, among the underlying considerations in such cases must be the nature 
of any testamentary injustice, and the state’s perceived involvement in perhaps 
approving of or giving effect to that injustice.  Not all injustice is equal in these 
respects. 
A clear sense of the dynamics involved is conveyed in another context by Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, dissenting, in an important ‘state action’ case.119  Justice 
Marshall doubts that a heavily regulated utility’s granting only limited hearing rights 
to alleged non-paying customers involves no “state action.”120  This is a case of the 
utility’s denying service on grounds of merely alleged non-payment.  The majority 
finds no state action in such a case.  But Justice Marshall then raises a hypothetical 
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 Streight, 360 P.2d at 305. 
 
114
 Estate of Sensenbrenner, 278 N.W.2d 887, 897 (Wis. 1979) (emphasis added). 
 
115
 Riggs v. Palmer 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).  For a classic broad, jurisprudential 
discussion of this case, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-45 (1978). 
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 Riggs, 22 N.E. at 191 (Gray, J., dissenting). 
 
117
 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR, act I for a classic disposition inter vivos. 
 
118
 Succession of Willis, 149 So. 2d 218, 220 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (emphasis added). 
 
119
 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 365, 373-74 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 
120
 Id. 
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question: What if an equally regulated utility had adopted a policy denying utility 
service on the basis of race?  Would the majority in that case still have found no state 
action?121 
Justice Marshall understandably suspects that in the latter case, state action 
would indeed be found.  The best explanation for any differences in the two case 
outcomes would, on our view, reflect the basic idea that the scope of ‘state action’ 
should generally reflect the scope of the state’s moral responsibilities, given its 
powers and limitations thereon.122  Not all initially private injustices are equal in 
gravity, or in broader cultural and historical meaning and import.123  For some kinds 
of injustices, particularly those explicitly involving race, the state should more 
readily accept a significant share of responsibility. 
On this basis, consider the Supreme Court’s legal reactions to the initially 
personal injustice, as we would now universally see it, resulting in the cases of 
Evans v. Newton124 and Evans v. Abney.125  Against the background of broad126 but 
ultimately limited127 testamentary freedom was the devise of a hundred acres of land, 
centrally located in Macon, Georgia.128  The devised land was to serve as a public 
park solely for the use of white persons.129 
Under the will, the land was to be owned and controlled by the City of Macon,130 
thus establishing state action and triggering the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition 
of racially segregated public facilities.131  The majority in Newton recognized that the 
City’s maintaining the park for years, at first on the specified racially segregated 
basis, and then allowing, contrary to the will, for some non-segregated use, linked 
the City to the initially private racial injustice.132  The formal legal act of later 
                                                          
 
121
 Id. 
 
122
 For discussion, see R. George Wright, State Action and State Responsibility, 23 
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 685, 686 (1989) (“[t]he courts should find . . . ‘state action’ when . . . the 
state can properly be said to bear responsibility, of the right kind and degree, for the 
underlying act . . . .”). 
 
123
 The analogy may be unpersuasive, but we would typically not say that B bears partial 
responsibility for stranger A’s continuing hangnail symptoms, even where A accosts B on the 
sidewalk, and B happens to have a hangnail trimmer on his person, whereas we might hold B 
partially responsible–in a causal, or moral, if not a legal sense–if B callously fails to rescue, at 
low cost and low risk, a drowning stranger child.  Little depends, however, on the 
persuasiveness of this analogy. 
 
124
 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
 
125
 Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). 
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 See supra notes 111-118 and accompanying text. 
 
127
 See supra notes 111-118 and accompanying text. 
 
128
 Newton, 382 U.S. at 297, 304. 
 
129
 Id. at 297. 
 
130
 Id. 
 
131
 See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (a closer joint 
enterprise or “symbiosis” case of a private coffee shop on publicly owned land). 
 
132
 See Newton, 382 U.S. at 301. 
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substituting a private board of trustees for the governing public authority would not 
immediately transform the cultural meaning of the park, or dissipate the effects of 
prior state management and control.133  The City would, realistically, continue to 
bear partial responsibility for initially private injustice.134 
In the succeeding closely related Abney135 case, however, a different Court 
majority136 more controversially drew the line of public responsibility for initially 
private injustice.  The Abney Court found no denial of racial equal protection in a 
Georgia state court determination that because the testator’s racially segregationist 
intent could no longer be carried out,137 the trust provision failed138 and the land 
reverted to the heirs of the testator,139 as opposed to remaining as a racially 
desegregated public park.140 
Our point is not to dispute the testator’s original segregationist intent, the 
centrality of that segregationist intent, or whether the testator’s intent would have 
changed over time.  Rather, it is that the state became complicitous in the testator’s 
personal injustice when it chose to transform the now desegregated public park into 
privately owned property of the testator’s heirs.  The state was confronted with a 
choice between giving effect to the segregationist intent of the testator, or the 
testator’s intent to provide a public park, insofar as that intent was consistent with 
basic norms of racial justice.141 
Doubtless there is a sense in which Macon residents of every race suffered a loss, 
to one degree or another, when the now desegregated public park was returned, as 
private property, to the testator’s heirs.  But the state-imposed outcomes, and the 
resulting harms, were evidently not equally borne among the races.  Some persons 
might resentfully conclude that had the case not been brought, white residents could 
still have benefitted from the park.  Such resentment might, on this logic, have been 
focused on racial minorities.142 
More directly, though, the state’s decision to prioritize the racially segregationist 
element of the testator’s intent regarding public facilities over the intent to provide a 
park for Macon residents officially legitimizes an injustice.  The state decision in 
effect re-stigmatizes local members of a race deemed by the testator to be 
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 See generally Wright, supra note 122. 
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 Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). 
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 Id. at 436 (Justice Black, who had dissented in Newton wrote the majority opinion in 
Abney). 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. at 437. 
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 Id. at 445. 
 
142
 Of course, such an alleged injury might be deemed too speculative or uncertain to 
support legal standing.  See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757-58 (1984).  But see Salazar v. 
Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); United States v. 
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
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unqualified to associate with whites in public parks.  While the racial143 rationale 
underlying the will may well have been quite broad, the local African-Americans 
residing in Macon, Georgia bore most of the inevitable racial stigma.  That stigma 
was, as a constitutionally cognizable injury,144 thus felt locally rather than 
nationally.145  The state’s reconstruction and in a sense re-enactment and effectuating 
of the original racial discrimination should have been recognized as establishing 
partial state responsibility, state action, and ultimately a violation of the equal 
protection clause.146  The majority in Abney could thus have done substantially better 
in constitutionally responding to an initially personal expression of the vice of 
injustice. 
IV.  CONCLUSION: DO THE CARDINAL VIRTUES STILL MAKE A DIFFERENCE AT THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LEVEL? 
A.  The Cardinal Virtues in Contemporary Context 
Historically, the prominence of the cardinal virtues across cultural lines has been 
substantial.  The cardinal virtues are emphasized in the ancient Jewish tradition,147 in 
Plato,148 Aristotle,149 various Stoics,150 Thomas Aquinas,151 and as we have seen 
throughout, by a number of modern writers, in and out of fashion. 
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bequest to non-whites. 
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 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 755 (citing Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984)). 
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 See Abney, 396 U.S. at 450, 453-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  See Matthew Harding, 
Some Arguments Against Discriminatory Gifts and Trusts, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 18-
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MORALITY OF FREEDOM 381 (1986)).   
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fortitude”). 
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 See generally, PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 119-29, 139-42, 280-89 (Francis M. Cornford, ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1990) (1941) (on virtues in the polis; virtues in the individual; and 
virtues and vices under democracy); RAYMOND J. DEVETTERE, INTRODUCTION TO VIRTUE 
ETHICS: INSIGHTS OF THE ANCIENT GREEKS 95-96 (2002); David Carr, The Cardinal Virtues 
and Plato’s Moral Psychology, 38 PHIL. Q. 186 (1988).  See also DWORKIN,  supra note 29 
(Plato “offers conceptions of bravery, temperance, wisdom, and justice that show each of 
these to be distinct from the others . . . but to be interdependent nevertheless, so that the 
definition of each virtue incorporates an appeal to the value of other virtues.”); MARK J. LUTZ, 
SOCRATES’ EDUCATION TO VIRTUE: LEARNING TO LOVE THE NOBLE (1998). 
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 See generally ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 39-40, 65, 75, 78, 111, 114, 143, 
147 (David Ross trans., J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson rev. trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1980) 
(1925) (introducing and characterizing each of the cardinal virtues);  DEVETTERE, supra note 
148. Devettere notes that for Aristotle, political leaders, explicitly including judges, “need the 
virtue of prudence to discern what laws will advance the human good in their society.”  Id. at 
122 (citing ARISTOTLE, supra at 147).  See also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A 
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The cardinal virtues remain irreplaceable by any sort of institutional 
arrangements.  Courage and fortitude, for example, admittedly can be exhibited by 
persons in the service of good causes or evil while retaining its appeal as a virtue.152  
But courage remains realistically indispensable.  As the contemporary philosopher 
Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung observes, “[c]ourage enables us [to] be faithful to 
other people and our commitments when the going gets rough and so enables the 
loving, trusting, and secure human relationships that are essential to a good human 
life.”153  Or as Immanuel Kant more sternly argues, “[t]here are duties . . . to which 
[preserving one’s] life is much inferior, and in order to fulfill them we must evince 
no cowardice in regard to our life.”154 
Or consider the virtue of justice.  Justice as a personal virtue again “renders to 
each one what is due, neither more nor less.”155  An unjust desire for more than one’s 
share, or, classically, pleonexia,156 may for a time work for persons, classes, or 
nations.  But it is also possible that, in the words of Dr. King, “the arc of the moral 
universe is long but it bends towards justice.”157  In any event, not even those 
Federalists most enthused about structural checks and balances would have 
minimized the importance of the virtue of justice.  As James Madison himself 
                                                          
STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 153 (2d ed. 1984) (Aristotle’s virtue of phronesis as knowing “how 
to exercise judgment in particular cases”); Sarah Broadie, Aristotle and Contemporary Ethics, 
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argued, “[t]o suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness 
without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea.”158 
But for our purposes, justice as a virtue is linked with, and dependent upon, each 
of the other cardinal virtues.  And in our own era, the relationship between self-
discipline or temperance and both practical wisdom and justice in particular lies at 
the center of some of the most crucial public policy problems, including financial 
conflicts of interest among generations. 
A fundamental part of a crucial public policy problem, stated in virtue terms, is 
that in recent decades, “among people in the mainstream United States, strengths of 
temperance are infrequently endorsed and seldom praised,”159 with ‘prudence’ as 
well being occasionally minimized or disparaged.160  The historical recognition of 
the importance of temperance, self-restraint, and related virtues has been long-
standing and broad-based.161  Even in the modern era, the value of the temperance-
related virtues has not gone entirely unrecognized.162  But of late, the idea of self-
control as a virtue has faced indifference, hostility, and intense competition. 
In several recent studies, for example, Professor Jean M. Twenge has contrasted 
self-control with the widely emphasized idea of self-esteem.  The virtue of self-
control turns out to be a much better predictor than (high or low) self-esteem of 
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EDUCATION 168 (John Williamson Adamson ed., 2007) (1698).  
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EXCESS (2011); ANDRE COMTE-SPONVILLE, A SMALL TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUES 39 
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important outcomes.  Professor Twenge concludes that “[s]elf-control, or the ability 
to persevere and keep going, is a much better predictor of life outcomes than self-
esteem.  Children high in self-control make better grades and finish more years of 
education, and they’re less likely to use drugs. . . . Self-control predicts all of those 
things researchers had hoped self-esteem would, but hasn’t.”163 
The importance of the virtue of temperance, or its absence, may extend beyond 
the familiar indicators of basic prosperity or its lack thereof.  Sigmund Freud raised 
the stakes considerably.  Freud classically, if controversially, argued that 
[u]nder the influence of the ego’s instinct of self-preservation, the 
pleasure principle is replaced by the reality principle.  This latter principle 
does not abandon the intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it 
nevertheless demands and carries into effect the postponement of 
satisfaction, the abandonment of a number of possibilities of gaining 
satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on the 
long indirect road to pleasure.164 
Thus temperance, in the form of the collective willingness to defer gratification, is 
said to be ultimately a matter of collective “self-preservation.”165  If there is any 
ambiguity, Freud removes it by opining that “[t]he pleasure principle [or lack of 
temperance] seems actually to serve the death instincts.”166  At least on Freud’s 
theory, then, collective temperance may be ultimately not a matter of lifestyle, but of 
cultural life and death.167 
The need to collectively exhibit the virtue, as well, of practical wisdom or broad 
prudence should also be clear.  While practical wisdom is related to each of the 
preceding virtues, there is a sense in which we can think about practical wisdom in 
its own right.  Practical wisdom is not primarily a matter of motives, gestures, 
intentions, or symbolism apart from direct and indirect consequences.168  John Stuart 
Mill defines the term, while linking it to temperance, as “a correct foresight of 
consequences, a just estimation of their importance to the object in view, and 
repression of any unreflecting impulse at variance with the deliberate purpose.”169 
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A number of Supreme Court cases are thought to embody not just an admirable 
deployment of tests and rules, but the virtue of wisdom.  It is likely a sense of the 
Court’s broad and long-range perspective, along with the Court’s ability to discount 
fears of possible short-term consequences that lead some to credit the Court with 
practical wisdom in the “steel seizure” separation of powers case Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer.170  Practical wisdom requires such perspective; an 
understanding of persons and their interest, motivations, and capacities, and of the 
world and its workings.  In part, this requires the practically wise person, or court, to 
resist a variety of cognitive and other forms of bias.171 
Most broadly, and particularly in deciding important constitutional cases, 
Wisdom requires an experience-based knowledge of the world (including, 
especially, the world of human nature).  It requires . . . the ability to . . . 
discern the most important aspects of  the acquired knowledge,  knowing 
what to use and what to discard, almost on a case-by-case basis (put 
another way, it requires knowing when to follow rules but also when the 
usual rules no longer apply).172 
In some important constitutional cases, the competing legal rules, tests, legal 
principles, and legal doctrines can only carry the court so far.  In such cases, courts 
should, within the bounds of what is constitutionally legitimate, accept responsibility 
to exercise a form of practical wisdom that is not reducible to the application of 
competing constitutional tests.173  Without arrogantly assuming the role of Platonic 
Guardians,174 or otherwise violating their oaths and judicial role obligations,175 the 
courts should be alert to the possibility of supplementing the usual constitutional test 
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manipulations with a constitutionally legitimate, and humbly exercised, concern for 
practical wisdom. 
B.  Practical Wisdom and Affirmative Action: A Concluding Case Example 
Practical wisdom in constitutional adjudication will often be as much about the 
rationale or the justification of a constitutional decision as about the outcome itself.  
Let us briefly consider one final constitutional example.  In racial affirmative action 
equal protection cases, the standard paradigm calls upon the Court to adopt a 
particular level of scrutiny–typically, strict scrutiny.176  From there, the Court then 
typically seeks to determine the presence or absence of some particular compelling 
governmental interest,177 as well as whether the program at issue should be deemed 
narrowly tailored178 in promoting, to whatever degree is required,179 and by whatever 
level of proof may be required,180 the particular government interest on which the 
Court chooses to focus attention. 
There may be cases in which focusing on some single governmental interest and 
declaring that interest to be compelling may be the practically wise course.  But in 
the case of racial affirmative action and equal protection, emphasizing any single 
interest and pronouncing it to be compelling on its own, as opposed to 
acknowledging the range of relevant government interests, seems artificial, 
simplistic, and less than fully persuasive.181  Nevertheless, in the higher education 
affirmative action cases of Gratz182 and Grutter,183 the Court majority famously 
emphasized the asserted educational benefits of diversity as by itself a compelling, 
and thus sufficient, government interest.184  The Grutter majority indeed recognized 
that more than one kind of benefit might flow from diversity.185  And the Grutter 
majority also acknowledged other possible justifications for affirmative action in 
higher education, including addressing if not remedying186 past racial discrimination, 
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as well as the distinct values of public university autonomy and institutional 
academic freedom.187 
But in emphasizing diversity, in and of itself, as compelling,188 and then 
subjecting the diversity rationale, alone, to a narrow-tailoring inquiry,189 the Grutter 
majority opted for an artificial and unrealistic attempt at simplicity, at the expense of 
a likely practically wiser approach.  Most serious reflections on affirmative action 
are more multi-dimensional, more pluralistic, more holistic, and thus more genuinely 
encompassing and responsive to more concerns of more persons. 
The Court in Grutter did go some distance in this direction,190 but ultimately 
underplayed public interests in “remediation, compensation, corrective and 
distributive justice, broad utilitarianism, anti-subordination, integrationism and 
community preference, and the value of free and expert academic judgment.”191  Any 
given person might weigh each of these various considerations differently.  For some 
persons, perhaps no single one of these interests would rise to the level of being truly 
compelling.  But that is precisely the point.  Often, under realistic complex 
circumstances, no single interest or reason by itself may seem genuinely compelling.  
But a number of distinct interests, pointing in the same general direction, may jointly 
seem compelling when properly combined in a “cumulative case.”192 
Simply put, there are decisions that are best justified not on the basis of any 
single consideration, in isolation, but on the basis of an accumulation of more or less 
separate, distinguishable considerations.  It is, for example, only on the basis of a 
complex cumulative case that some persons might best be able to justify attending 
college, attending some particular college, marrying a particular person, or accepting 
a particular job offer.  More generally, judges who, like the proverbial fox, “know 
many little things,” and who adopt a flexible, eclectic, multi-factor approach to a 
problem often do better than judges, who, like the proverbial hedgehog, “know one 
big thing” and seek to apply their inflexible template whenever possible.193 
The proverbial wisdom of the fox, more often borne out in practice,194 may thus 
normally call for a more pluralistic approach than the Supreme Court adopted in 
Grutter and Gratz.195  A more intellectually inclusive approach thus might well have 
been practically wiser.196  And in general, the judicial exercise of the virtue of 
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practical wisdom, even at the cost of adjusting some established constitutional 
judicial tests,197 is itself of compelling importance. 
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